In this paper we examine the claim that natural resources invite civil conflict, and challenge the main stylized facts in this literature. We find that the nature of causation between resource dependence and civil war is opposite to conventional wisdom. In particular, (i) civil war creates dependence on primary sector exports, but the reverse is not true, and (ii) resource abundance is associated with a reduced probability of the onset of war.
Introduction
The appreciation for natural resources as a driver of economic development has undergone a dramatic change in the past decades. While economists generally perceived an abundance of resources as advantageous until the 1980s, an influential empirical and theoretical literature emerged in the 1990s that reached rather opposite conclusions. The phrase "natural resource curse" was coined and, perhaps because of its paradoxical connotation, caught on in both academic and policy circles. The current literature distinguishes between no less than three different 'dimensions' of the resource curse: resources are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) violent civil conflict, and (iii) undemocratic regime types.
1 Arguably, these different manifestations of the curse can be inter-related.
In this paper we focus on the nature of the relation between resources and civil war.
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) offered a pioneering empirical contribution based on crosssection analysis, where among other things they found that resource dependence had a significant curvilinear effect on both the onset and duration of war. As a measure of resources they used the ratio of primary exports to GDP, a measure also popularized by Sachs and Warner (1997) . In addition, they consistently 1 We cannot possibly do justice to the many papers in these three fields, but selected contributions include the following works. On economic growth, refer to Sachs and Warner (1997) , Mehlum et al. (2005) , but also Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and the citations therein. On conflict, refer to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) , Collier et al. (2007) , Ross (2004) , Lujala (2005) , and to the special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution devoted to the topic. On regime type (and institutions more broadly), refer to Karl (1997) , Ross (2001) , Leite and Weidmann (2002) , Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) , and Bulte et al. (2005) . Overview articles include Rosser (2006) , and van der Ploeg (2008) .
demonstrate the important role of low income and slow growth as drivers of conflict (see also Miguel et al. 2004 ).
The Collier and Hoeffler series of papers has proved influential and controversial, not least because of its focus on the economic roots of conflict. By now, the standard explanations of civil war as advanced by economists and political scientists are 'greed' and
The rational choice paradigm considers civil war a special form of noncooperative behavior, and the greed motive simply reflects opportunities for rebels (or rebel leaders) to enrich themselves, possibly by seizing resource rents. Grievance, in contrast, is rooted in a behavioral paradigm, and emphasizes relative deprivation, social exclusion and inequality (e.g. due to ethnic or religious divides, see for example Gurr 1970, and more recently, Regan 2003) . In the context of resource-rich societies, grievance might be exacerbated by insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labor migration (e.g., Rosser 2006) . Relevant for both the greed and grievance motive is that resource rents provide a potential source of funding for the start-up costs associated with initiating a rebel organization. The findings by Collier and
Hoeffler support the greed perspective. Rebels, then, may be viewed as rational predators or, using terms with a less negative connotation, as entrepreneurs following up on a profitable opportunity. The theoretical underpinnings of this perspective may be traced back to Grossman (1991) and Hirschleifer (1995) .
A small "cottage industry" has now emerged in economics and political science on the purported association between natural resources and civil war (Ross 2004a , Ron 2005 , and the resource-war link is increasingly viewed as a stylized fact. However, this link, and in 2 Ballantine (2003) has noted that the mix of greed and grievance can be particularly potent, and relevant as an explanation of the onset of war (see also Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007) . For an interesting discussion of the motives of rebels, and the interaction between opportunistic and ideological leaders (as well as its consequences for the 'type of war' that evolves), refer to Weinstein (2005) . Ross (2004b) examines the greed and grievance motives, along with other possible conflict triggers, in a series of case studies. Other reasons why resources might be linked to conflict have to do with the probability of foreign intervention (Rosser 2006) political structures, and discuss the "looting versus provision of public goods" dilemma faced by incumbent political leaders in resource-rich societies, in their most recent work they again emphasize rebel decision-making (Collier et al. 2007) . Employing the most recent data, they argue in favour of military and financial 'feasibility' as key concepts. Conflict will emerge whenever it is feasible (i.e. whenever profitable opportunities for violence exist, the rebel niche will be filled), and the exact motivation is of less importance. But, as argued by Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007: 14) , this almost amounts to rephrasing the initial greed argument -"the basic arguments and empirical evidence are much the same as before."
Also, the relation between the nature of conflict (if any) and different types of resources is far from understood. Finally, complicating matters further, there is a literature that implicates resource scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1999). Scarcity is linked to conflict via two mechanisms: it may trigger marginalization of powerless groups by an elite scrambling for resources, and it could have a debilitating effect on processes of social and economic innovation (resulting in an 'ingenuity gap'). In the words of Hirschleifer (1995: 44): "As Malthusian pressures depress per capita incomes, it comes to a choice between fighting and starving." For a formal model analyzing this issue in theory, refer to Grossman and Mendoza (2003) .
We return to the scarcity-abundance dichotomy later when discussing our own results.
For now we simply note that in light of these outstanding controversies, and the obvious relevance of the research subject for the lives and prospects of millions of people, it is easy to predict that the resource-war link will remain a lively field of enquiry for economists and political scientists in the future.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the nature of the causal link between resources and the onset of war. 5 As mentioned above, most analyses are based on the ratio of primary exports to GDP. While the literature refers to this variable as both a 5 We do not consider the relation between resources and conflict duration or intensity. For more work on these issues, refer to Doyle and Sambanis (2000) , Ballantine (2003) , Ross (2003 , 2004b ), and Fearon (2004 Our main findings turn received wisdom upside down. We find that resource dependence is indeed an endogenous variable in conflict regressions, and that properly accounting for this endogeneity removes the statistical association between dependence and conflict. In a follow-up regression we demonstrate, not surprisingly, that a country's history with respect to war and peace is a significant determinant of resource dependenceclenching our main result. Moreover, we find a significant negative relationship between resource abundance and the onset of war, possibly because of an income effect, suggesting that the label "resource curse" seems misplaced. Resource-rich countries have on average a lower propensity to enter a civil war, but countries that do end up with civil strife (possibly resource-poor ones) will experience increasing dependence on the primary sector.
Data and Empirical Strategy
We now outline our empirical procedure and present the most important data. Following up on the empirical strategy by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) We then proceed by analyzing the impacts of resource dependence as well as abundance on 7 Fearon (2005) demonstrates that the results of Collier and Hoeffler are not robust to using annual panel data. However, it is not evident that annual data better capture the potentially "slow dynamics" that may trigger the onset of war.
the propensity of conflict to start. Our main resource abundance stock variable may directly affect the probability of conflict (through rebellion motives), but the influence may also be indirect through the level of resource dependence or income. We explicitly distinguish between such direct and indirect linkages.
We run three different regression equations -a resource dependence equation, an income equation, and a conflict regression equation. The former two regressions are important to assess whether resource dependence RD (denoted by sxp, calculated as primary exports divided by GDP) is a proper exogenous variable in conflict regressions, as implicitly assumed in empirical work until now. Specifically, we try to unravel the determinants of resource dependence as follows:
RA measures resource abundance in period t in country i, and is included to account for the notion that resource-rich economies may have a comparative advantage in exporting primary products. We use estimates of the net present value of rents (in USD per capita) of a country's total natural capital stock, taking the natural logarithm of the value in order to reduce the influence of outliers (lnnatcap). The aggregate measure includes subsoil assets (fuel and non-fuel minerals), cropland, pastureland, timber and non-timber forest resources, and protected natural areas. We also consider two disaggregate measures, focusing on mineral resources and land (crop-and pastureland, protected areas, and forest resources)
separately. All these RA estimates are taken from extensive studies by the World Bank (1997, 2006 countries, respectively, albeit at the cost of omitting all non-mineral natural resources from the analysis.
How "exogenous" are our resource wealth measures? We argue that the data on natural resource wealth are likely to be relatively independent of local issues (including conflict intensity), and therefore exogenous for our purpose. The (fuel and non-fuel) mineral deposits have been well explored and estimated due to the potentially large profits they represent, and also thanks to the involvement of large multinational firms who operate with little regard for local political or technological conditions. 9 Of course, our resource abundance data are not perfect, as the present value of rents is not completely invariant with respect to policies, and exploration and exploitation efforts may to some extent be determined by the level of development. But we believe they are less prone to the policy endogeneity which plagues export-based and rent-based dependency measures; and less subject to technology standards which influence production levels (see also Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). In addition, they offer the great advantage of potentially covering all natural resources in the estimation, which to the best of our knowledge is unique to this dataset.
10 Equation (1) thus captures the fact that resource dependence may be influenced by both the biophysical context (resource abundance), and by the institutional framework and the policy choices it generates (government system and trade openness). As mentioned above, since we don't wish to rule out a priori that something similar applies to our income variable, we also run a series of regressions akin to (1) but with income I (i.e. the log of GDP per capita at the start of each period, lngdp) as the dependent variable.
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The main conditioning variables serving as exogenous instruments for RD and lngdp are average openness to trade over the previous 5-year period (openness); a dummy variable for a presidential-type system of government; 12 latitude; percent of land area in the tropics;
and distance to the nearest coast or navigable river (distcr).
Our main challenge is to examine the impact of resource dependence (RD) and abundance (RA) on the propensity of conflict to start, both directly and indirectly (for the case of abundance). To this end, we compare the results of pooled instrumental variable (IV) probit and panel data IV regression analyses: Table 1 about here >> Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Per capita GDP and GDP growth are both considerably lower at the start of a conflict episode, in accordance with one of the standard economic explanations for violent conflict. Resource dependence and abundance are also lower during conflict episodes, which is counterintuitive given the substantial evidence in previous research showing that natural resources increase the risk of conflict. However, the finding is consistent with the observation in Collier et al. (2007) .
<< Insert

Regression Results and Robustness Analysis
We now present our empirical results. In the first two columns of Specifically, we obtain a concave relationship between resource dependence and the onset of conflict. However, we find that the logarithmic specification highlights this correlation most clearly and robustly, and in what follows we use the log of the share of primary exports in income as our key resource dependence variable. The coefficients for the other variables are also in line with previous research. We find a negative correlation between the onset of war on the one hand, and (logged) income, income growth, the duration of peace, and the French colony dummy on the other hand. In contrast, there is a positive correlation between (logged) population size and the propensity of war. The percentage of young men, the variable measuring mountainous area, and social fractionalisation appear to have no correlation with civil war, which is also consistent with many earlier studies. 13 We don't find any effect of the political system on the onset of civil war (polity), although the coefficient has the positive and somewhat counterintuitive sign frequently observed in earlier studies. Possibly this variable picks up conflicting factors: autocratic regimes may be better able to repress potential insurgents, and democratic regimes may be better at buying the peace through provision of public goods and catering for the median voter (see Azam 2001 for a treatment). However, weakly democractic regimes (i.e. with low positive values on the polity scale) may also be more subject to potentially destabilizing political changes.
In column 3 we introduce our aggregate resource abundance variable. It enters with a significant and negative coefficient -countries with more abundant natural capital appear to have a lower probability of becoming engaged civil war. This result also holds when we run a logit estimation adjusted for the "rare event" nature of civil war, as shown in Moreover, in light of our earlier arguments, there is reason to suspect that resource dependence may be endogenous, and similarly, income may also be endogenously determined. For this reason we proceed by simultaneously instrumenting for resource dependence and income in a series of follow-up regressions.
In columns (4)- (6) we instrument for income and resource dependence using a series of instruments. We apply a pooled two-step ivprobit model, where the two endogenous variables are estimated in the first stage by a simple linear regression, while the second stage uses a probit approach to determine the probability of the onset of war. (2) and (5)) is based on subsoil wealth only (fuel and non-fuel mineral resources), and specification (6) (columns (3) and (6) Returning to Panel A, the test statistics at the bottom provide clear support for the idea that income and resource dependence are jointly endogenous, and that instrumenting for these variables is necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal relationships running from dependence and income to the onset of conflict. The most important results are threefold. First, the peace variable is no longer significant. Instead, first-stage results presented in Panel B show that peace is strongly correlated with both lower resource dependence and higher per-capita incomes, lending some support to the argument advanced by other researchers that dependence may be endogenous to conflict, since the primary sector is more location-specific than the manufacturing industry and less likely to flee the country in case of (threatened) war (see e.g. Ross 2004 ).
Second, higher incomes again attenuate the risk of conflict (see also Miguel et al., 2004 , Collier et al. 2007 ). Indeed, its coefficient has nearly tripled with respect to before and is consistently highly significant. Third, there is no evidence of a negative causal relation running from dependence to conflict. After we instrument for dependence, the effect vanishes, which suggests that the correlation between these variables was in part driven by the impact of conflict on the composition of exports and income -shifting in favour of primary commodities. Columns (4)-(6) indicate that this is true for our aggregate abundance measure, for subsoil resources, and also for land.
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This brings us to our main result. Resource-rich countries are not generally "cursed"
in the sense that they run a greater risk of being torn by civil wars. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true: resource wealth has a positive and significant effect on income, and this in turn reduces the risk of war. Our results therefore support the hypothesis of Homer-Dixon (1999) that resource scarcity may be a trigger of conflict. While some analysts have argued that scarcity might be especially relevant in the context of land-based resources (it has been viewed a key driver of conflicts in several countries, including Rwanda and Burundi -e.g., see Andre and Platteau 1998), our findings suggests that the mechanism may be more general, and relevant for a broad range of resources. As far as the magnitude of this effect is concerned, we find that increasing resource abundance by one standard deviation reduces the risk of war from 7.1% to 6.7%, or a 4.5% reduction in risk (evaluating variables at the sample mean). Finally, there is no evidence to believe that resource dependence causes civil wars. Instead, our findings support an opposite causal relation, running from conflict to resource dependence.
Robustness analysis
To what extent are these results robust to alternative model specifications? In Table 3 we provide the second-stage results of a series of representative examples (first-stage results for income and dependence are omitted to save space, but proved very similar to those shown in Table 2 , Panel B). While the significance of specific control variables varies from one specification to another (e.g., fractionalization, polity, duration of peace and the French colony dummy), it is clear that our main results are very robust.
In column (1) proved insignificant. In column (3), we introduce regional dummies for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa; again, the main coefficients of interest remain robust to these controls.
In columns (4)- (6) (5) and (6) we use, respectively, per capita oil production and reserve data from
Humphreys (2005). While we are not confident that the production data are fully exogenous, it is comforting to observe that our main first and second stage results are confirmed.
<< Insert Table 3 about here >>
Results from further robustness tests are reported in Table 4 . Column (2) reports results from a panel regression while instrumenting for income and resource dependence, using the same data as before. In contrast to earlier IV probit analyses, we have now estimated a linear equation. While ideally we would do a panel probit regression and instrument for income and dependence, the routine is not available for such a regression.
Regardless, we find the main results are robust with respect to the nature of the estimation method. Again, resource abundance has an attenuating indirect effect on the risk of war, via income, and resource dependence has no statistical effect at all.
In column (3) we adjust our approach of tackling ongoing conflict, coding it as "0" instead of missing, and adding a dummy variable for conflict in the previous period instead of peace years to avoid confusing war onset and duration. While including a dummy for ongoing conflict does not affect any of our main results from the first and second stages, it does compromise significance levels of some of our control variables (population size, fractionalization, mountainous territory), although there is little change in the magnitude of the coefficients. In the first stage, violent conflict in the previous period still increases resource dependence (the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant at the 7% level), while it does not significantly affect income levels.
Columns (4) and (5) Columns (4) and (5) suggest it does not. In column (4) we report results using the two-step ivprobit routine as above with ongoing conflicts coded as missing, and in column (5) we again code it as "0" and introduce a dummy variable to capture previous conflict.
Regardless of the specification, we find the results using the ACD data are different from the ones for the COW dataset. First-stage results still suggest that previous episodes of conflict significantly increase resource dependence. Moreover, while it is still the case that resource abundance has an important indirect and attenuating effect on the onset of violence via income, we now also find that resource dependence enters significant and positive. 17 With other words, resources -or possibly the distribution of resource rents -do not seem a reason for full-blown war, where issues related to grievance (e.g. economic underdevelopment) appear to be more important; but they may trigger more small-scale conflicts.
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Since resource abundance increases both income and dependence in the first stage, and since income and dependence have opposite effects in the second stage, the net effect of abundance on small scale violence is ambiguous. Upon combining results from the first and second stages, we can assess the net effect of resources on violence. Specifically, a onestandard deviation increase in resource abundance decreases the risk of all levels of conflict via higher incomes by 0.27%, and simultaneously increases the risk via increased resource dependence by 0.20%. The net effect of resource abundance, therefore, continues to be a reduction in the probability of conflict, although the limited magnitude in fact suggests that resources are not a major determinant of conflict in any event. A robust finding of this study is that resource abundance attenuates the risk of conflict, and labelling resources a curse for development appears misleading in this light.
Discussion and Conclusions
According to both the economics and political science literature, natural resources tend to magnify the risk of civil war. While there are debates about the types of resources that are most prone to enhance the propensity of conflict, and about the nature of the mechanism linking resources to conflict, the resource-war link is often viewed as a stylized fact. Indeed, it is commonly treated as one of the dimensions of the paradoxical resource curse perspective -the view that more of a good thing may be bad for development. Resource wealth is nowadays associated with slow growth, bad governance and greater risk of conflict (see Rosser 2006 for an overview of all dimensions).
In this paper we qualify this interpretation, and indeed turn received wisdom upside down. We find evidence of a link between resource wealth and the onset of conflict, but demonstrate it runs opposite to the usual perspective. Resource wealth, via an income effect, lowers the probability of conflict, and especially of the onset of a major conflict. Moreover, we find no evidence of an across-the-board link running from resource dependence to civil war. Instead, the opposite is true -conflict-torn societies become dependent on natural resources, which arguably is hardly a paradox. These findings corroborate earlier results by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) in the domain of resources and slow growth, who also distinguish between abundance and dependence. Their main results in the domain of growth echo the ones about conflict above. Our findings are also consistent with Homer-Dixon's view that resource scarcity -rather than abundance -may drive conflict. Interestingly, it appears as if the mechanism is not only relevant for land-based resources -triggering a Malthusian-type of scramble for subsistence resources -but also for subsoil resource wealth.
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Our extensive array of alternative specifications supports the idea that the various resource-war linkages as identified in this paper are robust, particularly when we consider major conflicts with a threshold of at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year. When we include smaller conflicts (starting at 25 battle-related deaths per year and 1000 deaths overall), resource abundance still has a net conflict-reducing effect, although it does increase the probability of conflict via the resource dependence channel.
While we believe the distinction between resource dependence (a flow variable) and abundance (a stock variable) is valuable, and that the proper treatment of endogeneity and reverse causality is essential, we do not view this as the definitive treatment on resources and conflict. Our preferred abundance variable is only available for up to 98 countries, and while it presents a nice combination of industrial and developing countries, we cannot rule out that the dataset suffers from selection bias, as the limited country coverage eliminates several conflict episodes from our main estimations. Moreover, while we believe our abundance variable to be largely exogenous to conflict, by its nature it displays very little variation over time, and the dataset moreover offers only two observations so far. This introduces restrictions on the type of econometric techniques that may be used. We view this as an inevitable consequence of analyzing resource abundance and tackling the endogeneity problem that compromises earlier work on time-variant flow variables. Nevertheless, we appreciate that our treatment of abundance in the core regressions represents an extreme perspective (indeed: the opposite extreme of the annual export, production or rent variables featuring in many panel studies). Importantly however, our main results appear robust with respect to time-varying oil production and reserve data, which also cover a wider range of countries and (conflict) episodes.
Two final remarks are in order. First, following most of the earlier work based on resource dependence, we have excluded some of the most contested resources. In particular, secondary ('lootable') diamonds are often implicated as a driver of conflict, but do not feature in our abundance variables. This is mainly for practical reasons -diamonds are also not included in the commonly used primary exports ratio variable, and therefore it appeared inappropriate to include diamond reserves as an instrument. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that (lootable) diamond reserves have a direct effect on the onset or duration of conflict (e.g.
Ross 2006), and we don't wish to downplay that possibility. Second, we have been silent on the exact mechanism linking resource abundance and higher incomes to a reduced risk of the onset of civil war. One interpretation is that the income of potential rebels is higher (or that the quality and quantity of public goods provided by the government improves), raising the opportunity cost of rebellion. A competing hypothesis will be that resource rents enable incumbent rulers to more effectively oppress rebellion. Our results therefore do not settle the greed versus grievance view on the resource-war link (even if the nature of the link is reversed). Analyzing this in more detail is left for future work. Notes: All estimations are IV probit; only second-stage results shown, with warstart as the dependent variable. The exogenous instruments for lnsxp and lngdp in the 1st stage are average openness during the previous period, a presidential dummy, latitude, percent land in tropics, distance to nearest coast or navigable river, and a natural resource abundance measure. The natural resource abundance variable in columns (1)- (3) is taken from the World Bank; the per capita value of fuel and non-fuel minerals in 1970 in column (4) is based on data by Norman (2007); per capita oil production and reserves data in columns (5) and (6), respectively, are from Humphreys (2005) . Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * , * * , * * * statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not shown). Gleditsch et al. (2002) . Column (1) shows a basic regression performed with rare events logit, corresponding to Table 2 , column (2). Column (3) shows our core specification (corresponding to Table 2 , column (4)) in a linear panel IV regression. Columns (3) and (5) code ongoing conflicts as "0" instead of missing, and include a dummy variable for conflict in the previous period. Only second-stage results are shown. The exogenous instruments for lnsxp and lngdp in the first stage are average openness during the previous period, absolute latitude, and total natural resource wealth lnnatcap in columns (3)-(4), and additionally a presidential dummy, percentage of land in the tropics, and distance to the nearest coast or navigable river in columns (1)-(2). Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * , * * , * * * statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not shown).
